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Summary. Gender is prohibited from use in decision making in many countries. This does not
necessarily benefit females in situations of automated algorithmic decisions, e.g. when a credit
scoring model is used as a decision tool for loan granting.By analysing a unique proprietary data
set on car loans from a European bank, the paper shows that gender as a variable in a credit
scoring model is statistically significant. Its removal does not alter the predictive accuracy of the
model, yet the proportions of accepted women/men depend on whether gender is included.The
paper explores the association between predictors in the model with gender, to demonstrate
the omitted variable bias and how other variables proxy for gender. It points to inconsistencies
of the existing regulations in the context of automated decision making.
Keywords: Algorithmic decision making; Credit scoring; Gender; Statistical discrimination
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the consequences of restrictions on information in automated decision
making. It analyses an example from the area of quantitative risk assessment in retail credit,
also known as credit scoring, that is used to decide which applicants should be granted credit.
Nevertheless, the results can be extended to situations of algorithmic decisions, in general, when
predictive algorithms are developed on historic data. Credit scoring is a collection of mathe-
matical and statistical models that predict the probability of a borrower’s default, using historic
data that may include personal characteristics such as age, income or residential status. Some
experts in credit scoring have suggested that large banks, retailers and insurers almost exclu-
sively use automated credit scoring systems to decide whether to accept or reject an application
(Anderson, 2017; Thomas et al., 2017). Already in 1997 Hand and Henley wrote
‘Nowadays it seems that the only organizations which do not use credit scoring approaches are the
smaller and/or more personal companies, and those concerned with corporate ﬁnance, where statistical
methods have been slower to be adopted’
(Hand andHenley (1997), page 531). There is also evidence that even smaller credit institutions,
such as microlenders, are adopting this lending technology (Schreiner, 2002).
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This study uses a speciﬁc example when gender cannot be included in a credit scoring model
as a factor or predictor and illustrates the consequences for a lender, and for male and female
credit applicants. Gender is prohibited by law from use in decision making in the majority
of developed countries. The prohibition follows from antidiscrimination provisions, e.g. the
European Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive (European Union Council, 2004).
There has been a long debate on how ‘equal treatment’ should be applied in retail ﬁnancial
services. Initially the Directive included a special clause, allowing the use of gender as a factor
in risk assessment in insurance and related ﬁnancial services, provided that it was justiﬁed by
‘relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data’ (Article 5(2); European Union Council
(2004)). Yet, in March 2011, the European Court of Justice cancelled this provision (European
Parliament, 2011). The insurance industry expressed the concern that, since gender is associated
with risk, its removal will lead to higher motor premiums for women, who are known to be safer
drivers compared with men (Oxera, 2010). The expectation was that the European Court of
Justice ruling would make premiums the same irrespective of gender, yet McDonald (2015)
showed that the difference in premiums between male and female drivers still remained as a
result of ‘proxies’—variables which are legal to use and are correlated with both gender and
risk, e.g. the customer’s profession. This correlation and the resulting insensitivity of themodel’s
predictive power to simple removal of the prohibited variable have been noted before (Andreeva
et al., 2004; Hand, 2012a, b). However, there is no clear guidance on how these correlations
should be treated and what would be a discrimination-free solution.
In this paper we illustrate empirically the consequences of legal restrictions on information in
situations of automated decision making, to highlight potential inconsistencies of the existing
regulations and to inspire further research into better solutions. In contrast with McDonald
(2015), we do not aim at evaluating the effect of a particular piece of legislation, but we rather
wish to illustrate how the principle of ‘equal treatment’ does not translate into ‘equal out-
come’.
We do it by analysing a unique proprietary data set on car loans from a European bank. This
data set contains gender, other application characteristics and observed credit performance.Our
illustration consists in following a standard credit scoring methodology that is used by banks in
practice to construct a model based on credit application variables, including gender. We then
remove gender (which is statistically signiﬁcant) and comment on the changes in parameter
estimates, which arise because of the omitted variable bias. We ﬁnd that the predictive accuracy
of themodel is not affected, but, whenwe simulate different scenarios for accept–reject decisions
by using models with and without gender, we observe differences in proportions of men and
women rejected by different models. Furthermore, we apply Bayesian networks (BNs) and
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to investigate the structure of associations between
gender and other predictors in the model. These associations can proxy for gender, and to
follow the principle of equal treatment consistently the correlated variables should be excluded
from the model in addition to gender. However, when these additional variables are removed,
a signiﬁcant deterioration in predictive accuracy is observed.
The paper contributes to the research and discussion on discrimination in several ways.
First, we provide the empirical conﬁrmation of gender’s statistical signiﬁcance in predicting the
probability of default in the context of auto loans. Second, we demonstrate empirically the
ineffectiveness of existing antidiscriminatory regulations that prohibit the use of gender as a
predictor in automated decision making. As noted above, removing gender from the model
leaves the predictive accuracy virtually unaffected, which would imply that for lenders there is
little difference in terms of which model should be used, since they can achieve a similar level of
classiﬁcation performance. And yet for consumers it matters which model is used as a decision
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tool when granting credit. We show that female borrowers have relative higher acceptance rates
when the model with gender is used, compared with the model without gender.
Third,we highlight the importance ofminority status, i.e., when the protected class constitutes
a smaller segment in the overall portfolio or population, it may not be represented appropriately
if the distinction between the minority and majority class is not allowed. We use the current
analysis as an example to demonstrate what happens to a minority class (women in our case)
when this class has better qualities compared with the majority. We believe that the intention
of the law should be to protect disadvantaged and/or minority groups. In our case women are
better credit risks compared with the majority (men). By prohibiting the use of gender, the law
effectively removes the possibility for women to signal their quality and for the lenders to include
this signal (gender factor) in the screening process.
Our last (but not least) contribution consists in revealing the associations and dependence
structure between all variables in the model, thus accentuating the interconnected nature of this
world and the difﬁculty of eliminating the effect of one single variable or factor.
The relevance of our investigation goes beyond the example of car loans, and we believe that
our arguments apply to a wide range of situations where models are built on historic data, and
the model captures the relationships of the past, which may include associations of protected
groupswith perfectly legal variables, such as profession or occupation. Themodel is then applied
to predict the future performance, thus extrapolating historic relationships into the future, and
the decisions are made based on those predictions. The timeliness and importance of such
investigations are demonstrated by the recent ‘Algorithms in decision-making’ inquiry of the
House of Commons Select Committee, where one of the questions was
‘the scope for algorithmic decision-making to eliminate, introduce or amplify biases or discrimination,
and how any such bias can be detected and overcome : : : ’
(Science and Technology Committee, 2017). The submission from the Royal Statistical Soci-
ety noted the experience from credit scoring as the example worthy of consideration (Royal
Statistical Society, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section brieﬂy reviews the
relevant economic theories of discrimination and previous empirical research. Section 3 gives
an overview of the credit scoring methodology. Subsequently Section 4 describes the data and
the results of the empirical analysis. The ﬁnal section discusses the implications and concludes.
2. Antidiscrimination law, theories of discrimination and empirical research
In general, the law distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination, although the details
may differ across the countries and legislations. Direct discrimination is based on the principle
of equal treatment and is unlawful. It arises when a person is treated ‘less favourably’ because
of the prohibited characteristic, such as gender or race. Indirect discrimination arises when a
neutral rule or criterion is applied to everyone, but people with protected characteristics are
disadvantaged. In the latter case the focus is on equal outcome, and such discrimination can be
justiﬁed, e.g. by business necessity (European Union Council, 2004).
Economic theory distinguishes between subjective taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971),
which is a consequence of subjective preferences or prejudices, and objective statistical dis-
crimination (Phelps, 1972; Stiglitz, 1993). Statistical discrimination is the consequence of in-
sufﬁcient information that is necessary to estimate the level of risk. Some relevant informa-
tion (e.g. the intention to repay or the ability to cope with adverse life events) cannot be ob-
served, so, if group membership is correlated or associated with this latent information and
both are associated with default, group membership can be used as a signal or a proxy. This
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distinction (subjective versus statistical) is not reﬂected in the law. As noted by the Alan Tur-
ing Institute (2017), the antidiscrimination legal principles were developed in the era of human
judgement and do not cover certain aspects of automated decisionmaking. One such aspect has
been pointed out byHand (2009, 2012a) and is linked to the concept of statistical or groupmem-
bership discrimination—the law denounces stereotyping based on group membership and calls
for the individual approach, yet probabilistic models that underlie the majority of automated
decision making rely on summary estimates derived from aggregated data, i.e. a probability
cannot be estimated on the basis of a single individual observation.
Previous research has focused mainly on ways of identifying whether discrimination is occur-
ring. One of the most popular approaches is a regression-based methodology where the coefﬁ-
cient for group membership is taken as a measure of discrimination. A vast body of literature is
dedicated to this topic, which is not reviewed here, but the interested reader can refer to
Andreeva et al. (2004) for a summary of this research and to Charles and Guryan (2011) for a
detailed discussion of limitations of regression and other approaches to detect discrimination.
The most widespread criticism refers to the omitted variable bias, i.e., if group membership is
correlated with residuals (unobserved or omitted variables), its coefﬁcient will be biased, so it
cannot be interpreted as an indication of discrimination. Given our data for the current study,
we cannot explore associations of gender as a group membership indicator with latent con-
structs that are not observed; however, we can make gender an omitted variable and explore its
associations with other predictors in the model.
Another popular strand of literature investigates whether protected characteristics have
negative or positive association with risk. Women have been found to be more reliable payers
in several studies in a variety of contexts and credit products (e.g. Agarwal et al. (2016), Coin
(2013), D’Espallier et al. (2011) and Do and Paley (2013)). We do not review this topic in detail
either, because the objective of this paper is not to prove that women are always better credit
risks since this may vary depending on the context and credit product. Instead we investigate
empirically the effects of legal restrictions on information in automated decision making and
the consequences for a decision maker and the segments that are represented by a prohibited
variable (men and women in our case).
Our investigation is linked to recent regulatory inquiries into algorithmic decision making,
which inspired research into discrimination arising from machine learning. Fuster et al. (2017)
showed that more advanced algorithms, such as random forests, increase discrimination, com-
pared with standard logistic regression. This is logical, since higher predictive accuracy means
higher discrimination in a statistical sense (i.e. better separation between the risk classes) and, if
there are true differences in levels of risk of protected groups, more accurate models will inten-
sify this distinction. Berk et al. (2017) quantiﬁed this relationship as the ‘price of fairness’ and
showed that, when the predictive accuracy goes up, the ‘fairness’ will go down. Nevertheless,
these references did not analyse the effect of equal treatment on unequal outcome, which is the
main focus of this paper.
Several studies (Fair, 1979; Johnson, 2004; Andreeva et al., 2004; Chan and Seow, 2013) have
postulated certain implications from the prohibition but have not provided any empirical proof.
One implication is that, if a prohibited variable is associated with default, its removal should
lead to a reduction in predictive power, which should negatively impact on lenders through
increased delinquency and cost of credit. The drop in predictive accuracy may also negatively
impact on consumers, if an increased cost of credit is passed on to them.
Another potential implication consists in restricted chances of being accepted for credit,
and this can affect protected and unprotected groups. However, the investigation of these im-
plications remains largely speculative in the absence of suitable empirical data which are not
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available (except for limited information that is reported for mortgages in the USA under the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (US Government, 2015). Taylor (2011) noted lack of data as a
major obstacle in discrimination research in non-mortgage credit. That is why, having obtained
the relevant data, we would like to investigate the predictive value of gender and its effect on
access to credit for men and women.
3. Credit scoring methodology
The project follows the standard methodology for building credit scoring models as described
in Anderson (2017), Hand and Henley (1997), Siddiqi (2006) and Thomas et al. (2017). Our
approach consists of mimicking the process of credit model construction in practice, so that
observations can be made about the potential effect in a credit granting environment.
Anderson (2017), Hand and Henley (1997), Siddiqi (2006) and Thomas et al. (2017) asserted
that logistic regression is the most popular and widely used algorithm in credit scoring and it is
also used in this paper:
logit.pi/=βTxi .1/
where pi is the probability of experiencing default (according to a selected deﬁnition) for cus-
tomer i and xi are predictor variables or characteristics.
The regression is preceded by the predictor variable transformation or coarse classiﬁcation,
which is a standard approach in credit scoring (Jung and Thomas, 2008; Baesens et al., 2009).
In the case of continuous variables, the ﬁrst step is to split a characteristic into intervals, usually
between 10 and 20. In the next step, adjacent intervals with similar default rates are merged into
larger coarse classes. This enables us to preserve any non-monotonic patterns, to treat outliers
and to include missing values that become a separate coarse class. Similarly, for categorical
variables, small categories are grouped together to achieve more stable predictions. Finally, the
resulting coarse classes are either replaced by weights of evidence or transformed into binary
dummy variables (Lin et al., 2012). In this paper we follow the dummy variable approach.
The estimated probability of default (PD) is used as a ‘score’, which can be viewed as a
summary of creditworthiness. Credit applicants can be ranked on the basis of the score or,
in other words, according to the level of their attractiveness to the lender. The accept–reject
decision is achieved by setting a threshold or cut-off: customers with a higher probability of
default than the cut-off are rejected, whereas those with lower PD are accepted for credit.
In addition to standard measures of model ﬁt, credit scoring models are evaluated in terms
of their ability to discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ credit risk. The area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve, AUC, is a common measure for the discriminatory power. The
receiver operating characteristic curve is obtained by plotting sensitivity against 1− speciﬁcity
for various cut-off points of the PD, with sensitivity and 1− speciﬁcity being deﬁned in the
following way:
sensitivity=TPOS.s/=n1, .2/
1− speciﬁcity=1−TNEG.s/=n1 =FPOS.s/=n0, .3/
where n1 andn0, are the numbers of events or defaults (marked as 1) and non-events (marked
as 0) respectively, TPOS is the number of correctly predicted events, FPOS is the number of
incorrectly predicted non-events, TNEG is the number of correctly predicted non-events and s
is the cut-off that is used to classify predicted probabilities into events or non-events (pi s is
classiﬁed as an event; pi <s is classiﬁed as a non-event).
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In the credit scoring context, sensitivity can be interpreted as a cumulative proportion of
defaults or the ‘bad’ customers with and above a score s (therefore, correctly rejected) and
1 − speciﬁcity as a cumulative proportion of non-defaults or the ‘good’ customers incorrectly
rejected (Thomas et al., 2017). The higher values of the AUC would indicate superior models;
no discrimination would correspond to an AUC of 0.5. This measure summarizes the ability of
the model to rank risk correctly over the whole range of possible scores or cut-offs; therefore it
does not require the choice of a speciﬁc cut-off.
It was shown by Hanley and McNeil (1982) that conceptually the AUC corresponds to the
Wilcoxon or Mann–Whitney statistic, which estimates the probability that a predicted PD of a
randomly selected bad account will be higher than or equal to that of a randomly selected good
account.
4. Data description and empirical results
The data set is a portfolio of car loans issued from 2003 to 2009 by amajor bank (which chose to
remain anonymous) operating in a European Union country. Table 1 summarizes the training
sample, which is used for the model estimation, and the test sample, which is reserved for assess-
ing themodel’s predictive accuracy. Splitting the data into training and test samples is a standard
methodology in credit scoring: here the split is 80%:20%. ‘Bad’ are customers who missed two
consecutive monthly payments—the deﬁnition that was used by the lender that provided the
data.
As can be seen from Table 1, females have a lower proportion of bad accounts compared with
males. It should also be noted that women are in the minority, constituting slightly more than
a quarter of the sample. For this reason and because the event to be modelled constitutes only
1.3% for women, and 1.82% for men, we used a random sampling stratiﬁed on gender and good
or bad status when dividing the data into training and testing sets. This is an accepted practice
in predictive modelling, in particular, of rare events, when it is important that both samples are
representative of the population(s) of interest. Kohavi (1995) has shown that a stratiﬁed random
cross-validation is superior in terms of lower variance and bias compared with a simple random
cross-validation. A single split into a training and test set can be viewed as one iteration of a
cross-validation with k = 2 folds.
Four logistic regression models were built:
(a) a model with gender (a training sample comprising both men and women) (model 1);
(b) a model without gender (model 2);
Table 1. Frequencies and percentages for men and women in the training and test samples
Results for training sample Results for test sample
Good Bad Total Good Bad Total
Number of female customers 16746 220 16966 4186 55 4241
% of female customers 98.70% 1.30% 26.71% 98.70% 1.30% 26.71%
Number of male customers 45696 847 46543 11424 212 11636
% of male customers 98.18% 1.82% 73.29% 98.18% 1.82% 73.29%
Total number of customers 62442 1067 63509 15610 267 15877
Total % of customers 98.32% 1.68% 100% 98.32% 1.68% 100%
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(c) a model for men only (a training sample consisting of men only) (model 3);
(d) a model for women only (a training sample consisting of women only) (model 4).
We decided to build segmented models 3 and 4 as opposed to including interactions terms,
because this approach is preferred in practice (Banasik et al., 1996; Bijak and Thomas, 2012;
Thomas et al., 2017).This is also in linewithourdesire todemonstrate thepossibilityof achieving
an equal outcome: with segmented models it is easy to accept or reject equal proportions of
men and women. Later in Section 4.2 we explore the associations between all the variables that
were used in modelling, including gender.
4.1. Parameter estimates, predictive accuracy and rejection rates
The results from the four models are reported in Table 2. We have used two criteria to include a
variable in model 1: the variable must be statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05; and it must show a high
predictive power in explaining the PD. We measured the predictive power by the AUC for each
variable separately and selected 12 variables with the highest values. Variables that were selected
into model 1 with gender are retained in other models to allow for comparisons of parameter
estimates.
As explained in Section 3, we followed the established practice in credit scoring of coarse
classiﬁcation (or categorization) and used dummy variables to represent the ﬁnal categories.
The reference category is selected to be the largest category.
The variables that show signiﬁcant statistical effects are consistent with the general literature
on credit scoring. Shorter loan duration and longer time in employment are associated with the
lower PD (Hand, 1998; Thomas et al., 2017). Females as well as customers having a job that is
typical forwomen aremore creditworthy, similarly tomarried applicants, and thosewhoprovide
both commercial and home phone numbers. Having children increases the chances of default.
Considering the features of the car purchased, customers buying cheaper vehicles, with
medium capacity engine and having the down payment over 50% of the car price are less likely
to default, whereas, in the case of the customers buying older cars, the risk is rising.
Whengender is removed (themodelwithout gender), small changes in the parameter estimates
can be observed, e.g. the parameter estimates go down for marital status and net income, but
increase for loan duration and time in employment. This illustrates the situation of omitted
variable bias when the protected characteristic is not included in the model, yet it is associated
with the remaining predictors and the dependent variable. The parameter estimates in themodel
without gender (model 2) still partially reﬂect its effect.
To understand whether there are differences in the risk proﬁles of the two sexes, separate
models have been ﬁtted to men and women (the last two columns in Table 2—model 3 for men
andmodel 4 for women). Although there are some changes in the estimated parameters between
model 3 for men only and models 1 and 2 (with and without gender), the variables remain the
same, except for some differences in the magnitude of the parameter estimates. In model 4 for
women seven out of 25 categories that were signiﬁcant in model 1 become insigniﬁcant, which
may be the result of women being a small segment in the sample. In contrast 3+ kids, which is
not signiﬁcant in model 3 for men, becomes highly signiﬁcant in model 4 (female). For other
categories that remain signiﬁcant, there is a pronounced change in magnitude; for example the
effect of single in marital status for females is almost half of that for males. There are differences
of model 4 from models 1, 2 and 3 (with and without gender, men) that are dominated by a
larger male segment (around 75%).
Measures of model ﬁt include the Akaike information criterion AIC with lower values in-
dicating better ﬁt, and the pseudo-R2. Models 1 and 2 (with and without gender) have been
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estimated on the same sample; therefore model ﬁt measures can be compared directly, and
model 1 with gender demonstrates better ﬁt. This, however, does not translate into superior
predictive accuracy (Table 3), where model 2 without gender is slightly better, but the difference
is an artefact of random variation (as will be shown in Section 4.3). Models 3 and 4 for men and
women have been estimated on different segments; therefore they are not directly comparable,
yet a judgement can be made relative to the corresponding measures for models with intercept
and intercept plus covariates.
For the AUC that is reported in Table 3 comparisons should also be made within the same
sample or segment. For the total sample the column ‘Model 3+4 for men and women’ refers
to estimated PDs that were obtained from segmented models but then combined into a single
score to make it comparable with the AUC for models with and without gender (models 1 and
2). Segmented PDs combined do show an uplift in predictive performance, albeit modest.When
looking at the predictive accuracy of models applied separately to men or women, for men there
is practically no difference between the three PDs, i.e. from model 1, model 2 and model 3.
The greatest difference is observed for women. Although there is little difference in predictive
accuracy for women from adding gender into model 1, the segmentation does enables unique
features of female risk proﬁles to be captured; hence a modest uplift is observed. The formal
tests of difference between AUCs will be reported in Section 4.3.
Yet the ultimate question is what this means for the chances of being accepted for credit.
To assess the effect on access to credit, we apply models 1 and 2 (with and without gender)
and calculate proportions of men and women who were rejected by each of the two models
for different cut-off levels that would correspond to a range of rejection or acceptance rates:
from 0.1 to 0.9 in 0.1 increments (Fig. 1). In this part of the analysis we address the concern
that was raised by two reviewers who quite rightly noted that in families it is usually men who
apply for credit, so it is unfair to claim that all female applicants are disadvantaged since, for
manymarried women, their husbands will apply for credit on their behalf. Therefore, we look at
rejection rates for unmarried customers and compare rejected proportions for men and women
when they are scored either with model 1 or model 2. Unmarried customers include single,
divorced and widowed, and constitute 21.57% of the total (with 8.91% of women and 12.66%
of men of the total).
For example, if a lender rejects 60% of the total sample (shown on the vertical axis and the top
row under the horizontal axis) and uses PDs from model 1 without gender as scores, 65% of all
men in the sample would be rejected compared with 54% of all women (shown on the horizontal
axis; ﬁrst and second rows respectively in the data table). However, if model 1 with gender is
used for the same cut-off (60% overall rejection), the corresponding percentages become 71%
for men and 45% for women, thus increasing the chances that women will be accepted for credit
and rewarding them for being better credit risks.
Overall, men, being less creditworthy, beneﬁt from the model without gender (model 2). In
contrast, women would beneﬁt from including gender, since more females would be accepted
for credit. It is important to note that the removal of gender does not make the rejection rates
equal for both sexes. However, if the objective would be to ensure an equal outcome—accept
the same proportion of men and women—this could be achieved with separate models 3 and 4
for men and women.
4.2. Interrelationships of gender and other predictors in the models
The results in the previous section demonstrate that, although gender has a statistically sig-
niﬁcant effect on the PD, its removal from the model does not change the overall predictive
accuracy as measured by the AUC (although there are changes in the rejection rates for unmar-
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rejected proportion of men/women
Fig. 1. Effect on rejection by gender when different models are used, considering different proportions of
men or women rejected versus the overall rejection rate, unmarried customers: the vertical axis and the top
row on the horizontal axis show the overall rejection proportion; values in the data table show the rejection
proportions for a given group and model
ried women). The apparent lack of change in the predictive accuracy can be explained by the
association of gender with other predictors in the model, so, when it is removed, other variables
that remain in the model act as a proxy for gender. In this section we explore the association
between predictors to understand how this happens.
We use two different techniques: BNs and MCA.
4.2.1. Bayesian networks
BNs are probabilistic models represented by graphs, where random variables are nodes and
conditional dependences between them are arrows or arcs. The graph separates the joint (or
global) probability distribution of the set of nodes V={X1, : : : ,Xv} into a set of local probabil-
ity distributions: one for each variable. This relies on the Markov property of BNs (Korb and
Nicholson, 2010), which implies that a random variable Xi directly depends only on its parents
pa(Xi). In our case we have multinomial (categorized) data; therefore, global and local distri-
butions are given as probability or contingency tables, and
P.X1, : : : ,Xv/=
v∏
i=1
P{Xi|pa.Xi/}: .4/
This formula assumes conditional independence. BNs are often used as causal models even
when estimated fromobservational data (Pearl, 1988). Specifying a causalmodel of credit default
is beyond the scope of this paper. In this section the objective is to identify associations between
gender and other variables in the models, and it is sufﬁcient to learn the skeleton of the network
or to estimate the undirected essential graph underpinning the network structure. This is the ﬁrst
step in constrained-based algorithms that conduct conditional independence tests to establish
relationships that are deﬁned by the Markov property above (Scutari, 2010).
Speciﬁcally, to understand the structure of connections in our training sample, we use the
‘max-min parents and children’ algorithm (Tsamardinos et al., 2006) as implemented in R
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Fig. 2. Markov blanket for flag, default indicator (model 1) ( , direct connections): variables with
underlined names are directly related to flag (default indicator); short and long names, occup (occupation or
profession), phone (phone number provided), engine c (car engine capacity), marital (marital status), net inc
(net income), toj (time in employment), term (loan duration), carage (car age), downp (down payment), price c
(car price), child (number of children)
package bnlearn (R Development Core Team, 2010; Scutari, 2010). It considers all possible
pairs of parents–children and then removes those that are not directly connected. It uses the
mutual information between categorical variables (Tsamardinos et al., 2006; R Development
Core Team, 2010). The rest of the analysis in this paper has been done by using SAS 9.4 soft-
ware.
Figs 2–4 show Markov blankets (collections of the node’s direct connections) for the
variables of interest. Fig. 2 presents the Markov blanket for ﬂag, the default indicator, and
the dependent variable that is of main interest in credit risk modelling. Fig. 3 shows the Markov
blanket for gender, which is of main interest for this study. Figs 2 and 3 demonstrate that gender
is not directly connected to ﬂag, but ﬂag is directly related to down payment, car age andmarital
status. Marital status in its turn is directly related to gender. Gender is also directly linked to
occupation and net income. When gender is removed from the model (Fig. 4), the direct link
between ﬂag and car age only remains. Therefore, even if gender is not directly related to the
outcome, its removal affects the structure of associations between the remaining variables.
4.2.2. Multiple correspondence analysis
Based on the dependence structure thatwas revealed in the previous section, this section explores
the relationship between gender and other predictors with MCA. To make results easier to
interpret and present graphically, we have restricted the variables that are used in this section to
Effect of Unisex Risk Assessment in Consumer Credit 15
Fig. 3. Markov blanket for gender
Fig. 4. Markov blanket for flag (the default indicator) with gender removed (model 2)
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those that are directly related to gender in the Markov blanket (Fig. 3), because among all the
variables that were used not all of them show a direct connection to gender. And it will be very
difﬁcult to provide a concise interpretation when the analysis is done on all 13 variables with
the corresponding categories. In addition, number of children has also been included given its
importance in describing the family status of credit applicants and, therefore, relevance for this
study. Number of children is directly related to marital status and occupation, which are in the
Markov blanket of gender.
MCA explores the relationship of multiple categorical variables similarly to principal compo-
nent analysis for numeric variables (Beh and Lombardo, 2014; Greenacre, 2016; Sourial et al.,
2010). The result of the MCA is a graphical representation of a contingency table to show asso-
ciations between the qualitative variables of interest in a low dimensional space. This shows the
patterns which cannot be revealed with pairwise analysis. The association or proximity is based
on a χ2-statistic or inertia, which is decomposed into eigenvalues, similarly to how the variance
is decomposed in principal component analysis.
The χ2-statistic summarizes the deviations in a contingency table between the observed
frequencies and the frequencies that are expected under the assumption of independence or
homogeneity of the categorical variables:
χ2 =∑
i
∑
j
.nij − eij/2
eij
, .5/
where nij is the observed value in row ri and column cj; and eij is the corresponding expected
value. The inertia is a measure of deviation from homogeneity (or how much variation is con-
tained in the table), which is not dependent on the sample size n:
φ2 =χ2=n: .6/
Following Greenacre (2016), let N be an I × J non-negative data matrix. The data matrix is
converted to the correspondence matrix P, which is a matrix of relative frequencies:
P= 1
n
N, .7/
where
n=∑
i
∑
j
nij =1TN1:
Row and column marginal proportions are given by
r=P1,
c=PT1 .8/
and diagonal matrices of row and column marginal proportions
Dr =diag.r/,
Dc =diag.c/:
.9/
Row proﬁles are contained in
R=D−1r P, .10/
where the elements of each row sum to 1. Each (i, j) element of R is the observed probability of
being in column j provided that it is in row i.
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Column proﬁles are contained in
C=D−1c P: .11/
The correspondence analysis algorithm computes the co-ordinates based on a generalized sin-
gular value decomposition of P:
P=ADαBT
whereA is the rectangular matrix of left generalized singular vectors,B is the rectangular matrix
of right generalized singular vectors andDα is the diagonalmatrix of singular values, so thatα1>
α2 >α3 >: : : , and
ATD−1r A=BTD−1c B= I: .12/
The principal inertias are given by
λk =α2k , k=1, 2, : : : ,K,
where K=min{I −1,J −1}:
In MCA
P=BD2αBT, .13/
because in this paper we use MCA based on the Burt matrix, which gives all two-way cross-
tabulations of the Q categorical variables with a number of categories J =ΣqJq. The number
of principal inertias or dimensions in MCA is at most J −Q. For more details on the theory of
correspondence analysis and MCA, refer to Greenacre (2016).
Table 4 shows the decomposition of total inertia with corresponding statistics, with the singu-
lar value indicating the relative contribution of each dimension to an explanation of the inertia,
or proportion of variation. The principal inertia is an indicator of how much of the variation in
the original data is retained in the corresponding dimension. Table 4 indicates that all variation
(or 100% of total inertia) in the Burt matrix can be represented by 13 dimensions (the total
number of categories—18—minus the total number of variables used—5). The contribution of
Table 4. Inertia and χ2-decomposition
Singular Principal χ2 % Cumulative
value inertia %
0.5533 0.2844 93455 10.94 10.94
0.4923 0.2424 79651 9.32 20.26
0.4655 0.2167 71226 8.34 28.60
0.4594 0.2111 69369 8.12 36.72
0.4530 0.2052 67436 7.89 44.61
0.4493 0.2019 66355 7.77 52.38
0.4467 0.1995 65570 7.67 60.05
0.4456 0.1986 65260 7.64 67.69
0.4434 0.1966 64595 7.56 75.25
0.4385 0.1923 63201 7.40 82.65
0.4218 0.1779 58464 6.84 89.49
0.3846 0.1479 48614 5.69 95.18
0.3543 0.1255 41259 4.82 100.00
— 2.6000 854455 100.00 —
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each dimension in total inertia (as shown in the column ‘%’ of Table 4) ranges as shown from
approximately 11 to 5, with no dimension encompassing the major part of the data.
Nevertheless, there are some high contributions of categories in selected dimensions as shown
in Table 5, which presents three of the largest dimensions (detailed results on other dimensions
are available on request). Here the main variable of interest, gender, only shows substantial
loading to the ﬁrst two dimensions: female is positively associated with dimensions 1 and 2,
with male showing negative association; therefore, here the differences between sexes are most
apparent. Dimension 3 shows high loadings or associations of income.
The interpretation of the results is complemented by Figs 5–7 where the judgement depends
on the extent to which the categories are relatively close to each other. In Fig. 5, the ﬁrst
dimension on the horizontal axis reﬂects a split of the clients on marital status and number of
children. In Fig. 5 divorced D, widowed W and single S are on the positive side of dimension
1, with married M appearing on the opposite (negative) side, although M is relatively close to
the origin or centroid of the data and, therefore, does not contribute much to the association,
whereas in the case of number of children the three categories 1, 2 or 3+ kids are on the negative
side of dimension 1, opposite mis kids (missing information) and no kids (these two are close
to each other and the origin). Dimension 2 (Fig. 5) separates gender categories, putting them
on opposite sites, namely female in the upper–positive part and male below. Furthermore,
dimension 2 separates female occupation (in the top right-hand corner) from two remaining
categories: neutral and male occupation. Dimension 3 (Figs 6 and 7) clearly reﬂects a division
of the income categories, namely low (Low inc) and lower middle income (Mid inc1) versus two
other categories, i.e. higher middle income (Mid inc2) and high income (High inc).
Categories that are related appear in the same quadrants, although the distance is approx-
imate. For example, the top right-hand quadrant of Fig. 5 shows that the following variable
categories are associated: female, female occupation, widowed and divorced. Similarly, in the
Table 5. Contribution of each category to each dimension
Variable Category Results for Results for Results for
dimension 1 dimension 2 dimension 3
Gender Female 0.8232 0.9901 −0:0875
Male −0:3001 −0:3609 0.0319
Number of children 1 kid −0:6188 0.7525 −0:2837
2 kids −0:971 0.3206 −0:306
3+ kids (3 or more children) −1:2519 −0:1746 0.5808
mis kids (missing information) 0.1841 −0:1729 1.8177
no kids (no children) 0.6476 −0:4171 −0:2174
Occupation female occ (occupations with 0.8005 1.6965 0.6333
female majority)
male occ (occupations with 0.0249 −1:0634 0.1797
male majority)
neut occ (gender neutral −0:0622 0.0484 −0:075
occupations)
Marital status D (divorced) 1.084 2.3252 1.4982
M (married) −0:393 0.0406 −0:1278
S (single) 1.4648 −0:789 0.3786
W (widowed) 1.532 1.2036 −0:2901
Income Low inc (low income) 0.3809 −0:0413 −1:0002
Mid inc1 (lower middle income) 0.1369 0.0816 −0:4144
Mid inc2 (higher middle income) −0:0633 −0:0327 0.3604
High inc (high income) −0:4638 0.0519 0.9153
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Fig. 5. MCA: position of categories against dimension 1 and dimension 2 (the distance is approximate and
represents the relative position of categories from the origin or centroid; full category names are given in
Table 5)
Fig. 6. MCA: dimension 1 and dimension 3 (the distance is approximate and represents the relative position
of categories from the origin; full category names are given in Table 5)
bottom left-hand quadrant male and 3+ kids appear together. The other categories close to
male, e.g. higher middle income (Mid inc2) or neutral occupation (neut occ) are almost at the
origin, so there is little association. In Fig. 7 male appears at the origin of dimension 3 (the
dimension that is associated with net income), female is not far from the origin but still appears
on the same side as low income (Low inc) and lower middle income (Mid inc1). One can say that
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Fig. 7. MCA: dimension 2 and dimension 3 (the distance is approximate and represents the relative position
of categories from the origin; full category names are given in Table 5)
female borrowers tend to be widowed or divorced and with lower income compared with males.
This makes the effect of gender removal from risk assessment even more socially signiﬁcant; it is
not simply the females in general who are disadvantaged by this policy, but socially vulnerable
groups within the female segment
4.3. Comparison of predictive accuracy
In this section we follow another suggestion from one of the referees and investigate whether
the predictive accuracy changes when variables that can proxy for gender are removed from the
model. In fact, such a situation may arise if regulators require not only prohibited variables to
be removed from the statistical models, but also variables that are connected to the prohibited
variables.Apossible choice is to use variables in theMarkov blanket for gender, i.e. those directly
connected to it, as identiﬁed in Section 4.2.1: marital status; net income; occupation. We label
these as models 1(a) or 2(a). We also subjectively add to the list of removed variables number of
children because of its connection with marital status, and label them models 1(b) or 2(b). The
full list of models that were developed and tested is as follows:
(a) model 1—all variables, including gender;
(b) model 2—no gender;
(c) model 1(a)—no marital status, net income, occupation;
(d) model 2(a)—no gender, marital status, net income, occupation;
(e) model 1(b)—no marital status, net income, occupation, number of children;
(f) model 2(b)—no gender, marital status, net income, occupation, number of children;
(g) model 3+4—combined PDs from model 3 (male) and model 4 (female); see Section 4.2.
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Table 6. Results of the tests of difference in predictive accuracy of models with different variables†
Model AUC Results for the following models:
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1(a) Model 2(a) Model 1(b) Model 2(b) Model 3+4
Training sample
1 0.9207 — 0.3342 <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 0.0041
2 0.9211 0.3342 — <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 0.0014
1(a) 0.9117 <0:0001 <0:0001 — 0.0391 0.4946 0.1763 <0:0001
2(a) 0.9119 <0:0001 <0:0001 0.0391 — 0.0273 0.3525 <0:0001
1(b) 0.9104 <0:0001 <0:0001 0.4946 0.0273 — 0.0599 <0:0001
2(b) 0.9107 <0:0001 <0:0001 0.1763 0.3525 0.0599 — <0:0001
3+4 0.9238 0.0041 0.0014 <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 <0:0001 —
Test sample
1 0.8901 — 0.7704 0.0074 0.0011 0.0093 0.0016 0.2034
2 0.8898 0.7704 — 0.0127 0.0020 0.0103 0.0015 0.1822
1(a) 0.8809 0.0074 0.0127 — 0.1150 0.6428 0.2517 0.1632
2(a) 0.8813 0.0011 0.0020 0.1150 — 0.0994 0.6378 0.0464
1(b) 0.8785 0.0093 0.0103 0.6428 0.0994 — 0.1255 0.1521
2(b) 0.8789 0.0016 0.0015 0.2517 0.6378 0.1255 — 0.0392
3+4 0.8943 0.2034 0.1822 0.1632 0.0464 0.1521 0.0392 —
†Values in the third–ninth columns are p-values for a pairwise test of difference against the null hypothesis of no
difference: Pr >χ2 test statistic.
The receiver operating characteristic curves that we are about to compare are developed and
applied to the same training and test samples, so they and their corresponding areas (AUC)
are correlated. Therefore, we use the test for correlated curves that was proposed by DeLong
et al. (1988), which tests that the selected pair of AUCs are signiﬁcantly different against the
null hypothesis of no difference.
As noted in Section 4.2, the removal of gender (model 1 versus model 2) does not affect the
predictive accuracy and this is conﬁrmed by high p-values greater than 0.05 in Table 6. However,
model 1 signiﬁcantly differs from all the other models, although it should be noted that the
difference with segmented model 3+4 becomes insigniﬁcant in the test sample. So the removal
of variables that are correlated with gender affects the predictive accuracy of credit scoring
models. If gender is then added to the model with correlated variables removed (model 1(a)
versus model 2(a)), the result is insigniﬁcant in the test sample. The same applies to models
without number of children (model 2(a) versus 2(b)). Therefore, we cannot conclude that gender
on its own is a powerful predictor, despite its being a statistically signiﬁcant variable in model 1.
This is one of the questions that can be explored further: there seems to be a weak effect
on predictive accuracy of a single variable or credit scoring models may not be sensitive to the
removal of just one variable, yet the effect becomes signiﬁcant for the combination of variables
(although it may depend on the exact combination of variables in the model).
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the concept of equal treatment (which is the fundamental principle
of antidiscrimination regulations) in application to statistical or algorithmic discrimination in
automated decision making. We have used the case of retail credit risk screening and examined
equal treatment of men and women, which translates into the prohibition to use gender in credit
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scoring models. The potential effect of the prohibition is considered for lenders (any effects on
predictive power ofmodels, or their ability to distinguish between good and bad borrowers), and
consumers (their chances of being accepted or rejected for loans). Our illustration of potential
impact is based on a data set of applications for auto loans, where women form a minority and
constitute about a quarter of the portfolio. Following a standard credit scoring methodology,
four models were built initially: model 1 with and model 2 without gender as a dummy variable,
and two separate models for men and women (model 3 and 4 respectively).
Gender is statistically signiﬁcant as a dummy variable, yet its removal does not have a pro-
nounced effect on the predictive power of themodel. This is due to the correlation or association
of gender with other characteristics that are not legally restricted and remain in the model. If
predictive accuracy is unaffected, lenders can maintain similar levels of bad debt for a given
acceptance level irrespective of which model is used; therefore, there is no effect on lenders. It
does not mean though that they will accept the same applicants when using different models.
The paper then concentrates on unmarried applicants to investigate the effect for consumers
and shows that female applicants, having lowerdefault rates in thepast, beneﬁt frommodel 1with
gender, which gives them extra points for being good risks and, therefore, increases their chances
of being accepted for credit. Their rejection rates are lower compared with those for men.When
applying unisex model 2 (without gender), the chances of being accepted for credit decrease
for women but increase for men, although, in general, females still exhibit lower rejection rates
compared with men. So the prohibition does not lead to equality in the outcome. It should be
noted though that, if the desire is to reject the same percentage ofmen andwomen, this can easily
be achieved when both groups are treated separately (models 3 and 4) and the same proportions
of both sexes that show better ratings on the corresponding scores are selected for credit.
The results are indicative of the law of unintended consequences. Surely, themain objective of
the equality provisions is to protect disadvantaged groups of consumers. Yet, it has been shown
that the regulations do not ensure equality of outcome. More creditworthy groups subsidize
worse risks, and justiﬁcation for this subsidy could be researched further.
Another potential pitfall for achieving equality is situations when protected groups constitute
aminority and, therefore, are not equally represented in the data and, one can argue, not equally
treated, as the result of this. In our case the unisex model 2 is dominated by a majority group,
and minority unique features are not captured by a ‘politically correct’ model (that does not
contain a prohibited variable).
One more controversy that we would like to highlight is the difﬁculty of removing the ef-
fect of prohibited variables. We have shown that gender is signiﬁcantly associated with other
‘legal’ variables; therefore, even when removed, the prohibited variable still partially inﬂuences
the model through associations. This explains the relative insensitivity of predictive accuracy
to gender removal and the remaining difference in rejection rates between men and women.
However, there is no clear legal guidance on potential solutions in such situations, i.e. what level
of association would be (un)acceptable?
In general, the paper has highlighted certain inconsistencies in the existing framework when
it is being applied to statistical discrimination. These highlights are particularly timely given
the increasing applications of machine learning algorithms in decision making. Nevertheless,
this study is not without limitations. An obvious limitation is that we investigate the accept or
reject decision by using a portfolio of accepted loans. This is, however, a well-known problem in
credit scoring: the models are developed on accepted loans, since for rejected loans the outcome
variable is not observed. There is a methodology to correct for a potential sample selection
bias called ‘reject inference’, but Crook and Banasik (2004) have investigated a variety of such
approaches on a rarely available unbiased population and concluded that reject inference was
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not effective. Therefore, we believe that our investigation of predictive accuracy is still valid.
As for the effect on the consumers, further research could investigate the overall population of
applicants, if rejected applications become available. Yet accepted customers form part of this
population, so one can argue that our results hold for at least part of the overall population.
Another limitation consists in the fact that the paper has explored only a limited number of
variables. Although these are typical variables as stated by the credit scoring literature (Hand,
1998; Thomas et al., 2017), they are by no means exhaustive in terms of other variables that
can be used in different portfolios, countries and credit products. Our study can be viewed as
an exploratory illustration highlighting the issues that would warrant further research.
Further investigation of other protected characteristics across a wider range of portfolios and
countries would contribute towards better understanding of discrimination mechanisms and
ﬁnding fairer solutions. Other areas of decision making, such as fraud detection, can also be
investigated.
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